Abstract Fischbacher et al.(2001), henceforth FGF, introduced an experimental design to
measure conditional cooperation in public goods games. We collected data from 17 …

Social cooperation often requires collectively beneficial but individually costly restraint to
maintain a public good,,–, or it needs costly generosity to create one,. Status quo effects …

Impersonal cooperation among strangers enables societies to create valuable public goods,
such as infrastructure, public services, and democracy. Several factors have been proposed …

A number of recent papers have looked at framing effects in linear public good games. In
this comment, I argue that, within this literature, the distinction between give-take and …

Pro-environmental behavior has social signaling value. Previous research suggests that
enacting pro-environmental behaviors can signal certain personal characteristics, such as …

Humans frequently cooperate for collective benefit, even in one-shot social dilemmas. This
provides a challenge for theories of cooperation. Two views focus on intuitions but offer …

We study two generic versions of public goods problems: in Provision problems, the public
good does not exist initially and needs to be provided; in Maintenance problems, the public …

We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online
Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than …

This paper examines the reflexive interplay between individual decisions and social forces
to analyze the evolution of cooperation in the presence of “multi-directedness,” whereby …

We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give-
and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or …