This paper argues that Haigh and Young's definition of noninterference for intransitive
security policies admits information flows that are not in accordance with the intuitions it …

Cyber-physical systems are processing large amounts of sensitive information, but are
increasingly often becoming the target of cyber attacks. Thus, it is essential to verify the …

The paper considers several definitions of information flow security for intransitive policies
from the point of view of the complexity of verifying whether a finite-state system is secure …

Separation kernels provide temporal/spatial separation and controlled information flow to
their hosted applications. They are introduced to decouple the analysis of applications in …

This paper presents an analysis of noninterference specifications used in a range of formally
verified systems. The main findings are that these systems use distinct specifications and …

Online event hosting platforms, such as Zoom Meetings and Twitch Streams, have
revolutionized the way we socialize with one another. These platforms offer a rich set of …

Intransitive noninterference has been a widely studied topic in the last few decades. Several
well-established methodologies apply interactive theorem proving to formulate a …

We consider the problem of quantifying information flow in interactive systems, modelled as
finite-state transducers in the style of Goguen and Meseguer. Our main result is that if the …

Noninterference provides a control over information flow in systems for ensuring
confidentiality and integrity security properties. In general, user A is not allowed to interfere …

The focus of work on information flow security has primarily been on definitions of security in
asynchronous systems models. This paper considers systems with schedulers, which …