(Under what conditions) Do politicians reward their supporters? Evidence from Kenya's constituencies development fund
We leverage innovative spatial modeling techniques and data on the precise geo-locations
of more than 32,000 Constituency Development Fund (CDF) projects in Kenya to test …
of more than 32,000 Constituency Development Fund (CDF) projects in Kenya to test …
Government fragmentation and fiscal deficits: a regression discontinuity approach
Some electoral systems favor strong single-party majority governments, while others the
formation of coalitions. Having one or the other is likely to affect economic outcomes in ways …
formation of coalitions. Having one or the other is likely to affect economic outcomes in ways …
Measuring geographic distribution for political research
Political scientists are increasingly interested in the geographic distribution of political and
economic phenomena. Unlike distribution measures at the individual level, geographic …
economic phenomena. Unlike distribution measures at the individual level, geographic …
Party institutionalization and welfare state development
MB Rasmussen, CH Knutsen - British Journal of Political Science, 2021 - cambridge.org
This article argues that the extent to which political parties are institutionalized shapes
welfare state development. Institutionalized parties allow politicians to overcome co …
welfare state development. Institutionalized parties allow politicians to overcome co …
Electoral Systems, Partisan Politics, and Income Redistribution: A Critical Quasi-Experiment
MA Górecki, M Pierzgalski - Comparative Political Studies, 2023 - journals.sagepub.com
Iversen and Soskice's notion that electoral rules affect democracies' propensity for income
redistribution is one of the political economy's most discussed concepts. Yet, it comes with a …
redistribution is one of the political economy's most discussed concepts. Yet, it comes with a …
Inequalities in place‐based representation: Looking inside electoral districts
M PRATAS, JM FERNANDES… - European Journal of …, 2024 - Wiley Online Library
Do representatives provide fair and proportional representation to each place in their district
or, rather, do they favour some places, creating winners and losers of representation? While …
or, rather, do they favour some places, creating winners and losers of representation? While …
Globalization and welfare spending: How geography and electoral institutions condition compensation
I Menendez - International Studies Quarterly, 2016 - academic.oup.com
What explains variation in the relationship between globalization and public spending on
compensation across countries? This article argues that the effect of trade exposure on …
compensation across countries? This article argues that the effect of trade exposure on …
Fit for parliament: a new index of electability, assessing the electoral success of group-based parties
D Bochsler, B Grofman, M Hänni - Journal of Elections, Public …, 2024 - Taylor & Francis
The openness of the political system for the representation of social or economic groups
through their parties is mired in complexities. Extant scholarship has identified multiple …
through their parties is mired in complexities. Extant scholarship has identified multiple …
Electoral system
JM Fernandes - The Oxford Handbook of Portuguese Politics, 2022 - books.google.com
Electoral systems are the backbone of representative democracy. They set the rules of the
game for voters to delegate power to elected officials and to make accountability work …
game for voters to delegate power to elected officials and to make accountability work …
The political geography of government formation: Why regional parties join coalitions
A Falcó-Gimeno - Party Politics, 2020 - journals.sagepub.com
Political parties differ in the geographic distribution of their support. This article argues that a
regionalized distribution of a party's votes facilitates its participation in government, because …
regionalized distribution of a party's votes facilitates its participation in government, because …