Opportunity and social mobility
C Phelan - The Review of Economic Studies, 2006 - academic.oup.com
Opportunity and Social Mobility | The Review of Economic Studies | Oxford Academic Skip to
Main Content Advertisement Oxford Academic Journals Books Search Menu Information …
Main Content Advertisement Oxford Academic Journals Books Search Menu Information …
Growth and risk-sharing with private information
A Khan, B Ravikumar - Journal of Monetary Economics, 2001 - Elsevier
We examine the impact of incomplete risk-sharing on growth and welfare. The source of
market incompleteness in our economy is private information: a household's idiosyncratic …
market incompleteness in our economy is private information: a household's idiosyncratic …
Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
C Wang - Journal of Economic Theory, 2011 - Elsevier
In an equilibrium model of the labor market, workers and firms enter into dynamic contracts
that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal terminations. Upon termination, the …
that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal terminations. Upon termination, the …
Dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium
AA Smith Jr, C Wang - Journal of Monetary Economics, 2006 - Elsevier
We construct a general equilibrium model with private information in which borrowers and
lenders enter into long-term dynamic credit relationships. Each new generation of ex ante …
lenders enter into long-term dynamic credit relationships. Each new generation of ex ante …
Credit in a random matching model with private information
SR Aiyagari, SD Williamson - Review of Economic Dynamics, 1999 - Elsevier
We consider a random matching model where agents have complete access to each others'
histories. Exchange is motivated by risk sharing, given random unobservable incomes …
histories. Exchange is motivated by risk sharing, given random unobservable incomes …
[图书][B] The emergence of trust
M Blonski, DA Probst - 2001 - academia.edu
We analyze the phenomenon of gradual increase of stakes in bilateral social interactions in
the context of a repeated game with two-sided incomplete information. The underlying stage …
the context of a repeated game with two-sided incomplete information. The underlying stage …
[PDF][PDF] Inequality and fairness
C Phelan - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly …, 2002 - Citeseer
Abstract This study uses John Rawls' behind-the-veil of ignorance device as a fairness
criterion to evaluate social policies and applies it to a contracting model in which the terms …
criterion to evaluate social policies and applies it to a contracting model in which the terms …
On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information
E Espino - Journal of Economic Theory, 2005 - Elsevier
In his seminal paper of 1928, Ramsey conjectured that if agents discounted the future
differently, in the long run all agents except the most patient would live at the subsistence …
differently, in the long run all agents except the most patient would live at the subsistence …
Capital accumulation in private information economies
R Bohacek - Topics in Macroeconomics, 2005 - degruyter.com
This paper provides a general methodology for introducing capital accumulation into
economies with private information and heterogeneous agents. The agents operate a …
economies with private information and heterogeneous agents. The agents operate a …
Money, growth, and risk sharing with private information
YS Kim - Review of Economic Dynamics, 2003 - Elsevier
This paper examines the implications of incomplete risk-sharing for endogenous growth and
welfare in a monetary economy. The market incompleteness comes from private information …
welfare in a monetary economy. The market incompleteness comes from private information …