We study optimal contracts in a regulator–agent setting with joint production, altruistic and
selfish agents, limited liability, and uneasy outcome measurement. Such a setting represents …

An agent can perform a job in several ways, which we call tasks. Choosing agents' tasks is
the prerogative of management within firms, and of agents themselves if they are …

We consider a firm's provision of safety and health measures (working conditions) in a
hidden action agency problem in which effort and working conditions interact in …

In an agency model with moral hazard and limited liability, we show that the provision of
perks can be inefficient, even if perks are contractible. Interestingly, there can be over-as …

When labor mobility is imperfect, employers (firms) will invest in the discovery of their
employees' talent at different tasks; in this case, agents become entrepreneurs only if they …

An agent can perform a job in several ways, which we call tasks. Choosing agents' tasks is
the prerogative of management within firms, and of agents themselves if they are …