Robust auction design in the auto-bidding world

S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao… - Advances in Neural …, 2021 - proceedings.neurips.cc
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for
the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve …

Bayesian combinatorial auctions: Expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers

S Alaei - SIAM Journal on Computing, 2014 - SIAM
We present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem
for multiple agents to single agent subproblems in the context of Bayesian combinatorial …

Redistribution through markets

P Dworczak, SD Kominers, M Akbarpour - Econometrica, 2021 - Wiley Online Library
Policymakers frequently use price regulations as a response to inequality in the markets
they control. In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of such policies from the …

Repeated auctions with budgets in ad exchanges: Approximations and design

SR Balseiro, O Besbes… - Management Science, 2015 - pubsonline.informs.org
Ad exchanges are emerging Internet markets where advertisers may purchase display ad
placements, in real time and based on specific viewer information, directly from publishers …

Bayesian mechanism design

JD Hartline - … and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science, 2013 - nowpublishers.com
Abstract Systems wherein strategic agents compete for limited resources are ubiquitous: the
economy, computer networks, social networks, congestion networks, nature, etc. Assuming …

Towards efficient auctions in an auto-bidding world

Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo - Proceedings of the Web Conference …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
Auto-bidding has become one of the main options for bidding in online advertisements, in
which advertisers only need to specify high-level objectives and leave the complex task of …

Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization

C Bandi, D Bertsimas - Mathematical programming, 2012 - Springer
Modern probability theory, whose foundation is based on the axioms set forth by
Kolmogorov, is currently the major tool for performance analysis in stochastic systems. While …

Multi-unit auctions with budget limits

S Dobzinski, R Lavi, N Nisan - Games and Economic Behavior, 2012 - Elsevier
We study multi-unit auctions for bidders that have a budget constraint, a situation very
common in practice that has received relatively little attention in the auction theory literature …

The landscape of auto-bidding auctions: Value versus utility maximization

SR Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, VS Mirrokni… - Proceedings of the 22nd …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
Internet advertisers are increasingly adopting automated bidders to buy advertising
opportunities. Automated bidders simplify the procurement process by allowing advertisers …

[PDF][PDF] Deep learning for revenue-optimal auctions with budgets

Z Feng, H Narasimhan… - Proceedings of the 17th …, 2018 - econcs.seas.harvard.edu
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions for settings with private budgets is a hard task.
Even the single-item case is not fully understood, and there are no analytical results for …