This chapter is about relational contracts, agreements for which the ongoing relationship
between the parties plays an essential role in determining what happens. Its concern is with …

This paper studies a relational contracting model in which the agent is protected by a limited
liability constraint. The agent's effort is his private information and affects output …

We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly
determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are …

Both aristocratic privileges and constitutional constraints in traditional monarchies can be
derived from a ruler's incentive to minimize expected costs of moral‐hazard rents for high …

This chapter reviews the literature on the theory of relational incentive contracts. It motivates
the discussion by the classic applications of relational contracts to the GM-Fisher Body …

I develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal wage
dynamics. Workers are heterogeneous, and each worker's ability is both private information …

This paper studies the optimal dynamic provision of incentives in employment relationships
with rents for the worker. In a model of relational contracts with limited liability, we show that …

This paper studies relational contracts with partially persistent states, where the distribution
of the state depends on the previous state. The optimal contracts have properties similar to …

We study relational contracts between a firm and a worker with mutual uncertainty about
match quality. The worker's actions are publicly observed and generate both output and …

We present a noncooperative model of a family's time allocation between work and a home-
produced public good, and examine whether the income tax should apply to couples or …