This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example,
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …

This paper constructs an efficient, budget‐balanced, Bayesian incentive‐compatible
mechanism for a general dynamic environment with quasilinear payoffs in which agents …

Traders that arrive over time give rise to a dynamic tradeoff between the benefits of
increasing gains from trade by accumulating traders and the associated cost of delay due to …

Financial constraints preclude many surplus producing economic transactions, and inhibit
the growth of many others. This paper models financial constraints as the interaction of two …

The game-theoretic literature on collusion has been hard pressed to explain why a cartel
should engage in price wars, without resorting to either impatience, symmetry restrictions …

Two individuals face a regular task that requires the effort of only one. They take turns but
sometimes arrange to swap obligations. These swaps account for their changing, private …

Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to a new task. Each agent privately
learns whether he is qualified for the task. An agent wishes to be chosen independently of …

How does feasibility of efficient repeated trade depend on the features of the environment
such as persistence of values, private information about their evolution, or trading …

In an independent private value auction environment, we are interested in strategy-proof
mechanisms that maximize the agents' residual surplus, that is, the utility derived from the …

Bargaining for retail goods is common in developing countries, but rare in the developed
world. The welfare implications of this difference are theoretically ambiguous—if bargaining …