To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance
mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this …

We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms. To quantify incentives to
manipulate stable mechanisms, we consider markets with random cardinal utilities, which …

This paper inspires from a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of
Public Education. We introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning …

Centralized (re) assignment of workers to jobs is increasingly common in public and private
sectors. These markets often suffer from distributional problems. To alleviate these, we …

Istudydynamicmatchingmarketswherematch…, andmatching is one-to-one and irreversible.
The proposed stability notion, dynamic stability, incorporates a backward induction notion to …

We study the trade-off between stability and students' welfare in school choice problems. We
call a matching weakly stable if none of its blocking pairs can be matched in a more stable …

In the school choice market, where scarce public school seats are assigned to students, a
key operational issue is how to reassign seats that are vacated after an initial round of …

We investigate the problem of reallocation with priorities where one has to assign objects or
positions to individuals. Agents can have an initial ownership over an object. Each object …

This chapter surveys the literature on dynamic matching markets, both its study of specific
market institutions and the allocations they can implement, and that of reduced-form solution …

Stability is often the goal for clearinghouses in matching markets, such as those matching
residents to hospitals, students to schools, etc. Stable outcomes absent transfers need not …