[HTML][HTML] News media and delegated information choice

KP Nimark, S Pitschner - Journal of Economic Theory, 2019 - Elsevier
No agent has the resources to monitor all events that are potentially relevant for his
decisions. Therefore, many delegate their information choice to specialized news providers …

Finite order implications of common priors

BL Lipman - Econometrica, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
I characterize the implications of the common prior assumption for finite orders of beliefs
about beliefs at a state and show that in finite models, the only such implications are those …

Approximate common knowledge revisited

S Morris - International Journal of Game Theory, 1999 - Springer
Suppose we replace “knowledge” by “belief with probability p” in standard definitions of
common knowledge. Very different notions arise depending on the exact definition of …

Commonp-Belief: The General Case

A Kajii, S Morris - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
We develop belief operators for information systems where individuals have an uncountable
number of possible signals, and we give a general version of Monderer and Samet's (1989) …

Common beliefs and the existence of speculative trade

Z Neeman - Games and Economic Behavior, 1996 - Elsevier
This paper shows that if rationality is not common knowledge, the no-trade theorem of
Milgrom and Stokey fails to hold. We adopt Monderer and Samet's notion of commonp-belief …

No-trade in the laboratory

M Angrisani, A Guarino, S Huck… - The BE Journal of …, 2011 - degruyter.com
We construct laboratory financial markets in which subjects can trade an asset whose value
is unknown. Subjects receive private clues about the asset value and then set bid and ask …

Disagreement is unpredictable

R Hanson - Economics Letters, 2002 - Elsevier
Disagreement is unpredictable - ScienceDirect Skip to main contentSkip to article Elsevier logo
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For Bayesian wannabes, are disagreements not about information?

R Hanson - Theory and Decision, 2003 - Springer
Consider two agents who want to be Bayesians with a common prior, but who cannot due to
computational limitations. If these agents agree that their estimates are consistent with …

Common Knowledge in Game Theory

L Ménager - Revue économique, 2023 - cairn.info
When something is known to all and everybody knows that it is known to all, everybody
knows that everybody knows that it is known to all and so on ad infinitum, this thing is said to …

On loss aversion, level-1 reasoning, and betting

I Erev, S Gilat-Yihyie, D Marchiori… - International Journal of …, 2015 - Springer
Previous research suggests that human reaction to risky opportunities reflects two
contradicting biases:“loss aversion”, and “limited level of reasoning” that leads to …