[HTML][HTML] News media and delegated information choice
KP Nimark, S Pitschner - Journal of Economic Theory, 2019 - Elsevier
No agent has the resources to monitor all events that are potentially relevant for his
decisions. Therefore, many delegate their information choice to specialized news providers …
decisions. Therefore, many delegate their information choice to specialized news providers …
Finite order implications of common priors
BL Lipman - Econometrica, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
I characterize the implications of the common prior assumption for finite orders of beliefs
about beliefs at a state and show that in finite models, the only such implications are those …
about beliefs at a state and show that in finite models, the only such implications are those …
Approximate common knowledge revisited
S Morris - International Journal of Game Theory, 1999 - Springer
Suppose we replace “knowledge” by “belief with probability p” in standard definitions of
common knowledge. Very different notions arise depending on the exact definition of …
common knowledge. Very different notions arise depending on the exact definition of …
Common beliefs and the existence of speculative trade
Z Neeman - Games and Economic Behavior, 1996 - Elsevier
This paper shows that if rationality is not common knowledge, the no-trade theorem of
Milgrom and Stokey fails to hold. We adopt Monderer and Samet's notion of commonp-belief …
Milgrom and Stokey fails to hold. We adopt Monderer and Samet's notion of commonp-belief …
No-trade in the laboratory
M Angrisani, A Guarino, S Huck… - The BE Journal of …, 2011 - degruyter.com
We construct laboratory financial markets in which subjects can trade an asset whose value
is unknown. Subjects receive private clues about the asset value and then set bid and ask …
is unknown. Subjects receive private clues about the asset value and then set bid and ask …
Disagreement is unpredictable
R Hanson - Economics Letters, 2002 - Elsevier
Disagreement is unpredictable - ScienceDirect Skip to main contentSkip to article Elsevier logo
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Journals & Books Help Search My account Sign in View PDF Download full issue Search …
For Bayesian wannabes, are disagreements not about information?
R Hanson - Theory and Decision, 2003 - Springer
Consider two agents who want to be Bayesians with a common prior, but who cannot due to
computational limitations. If these agents agree that their estimates are consistent with …
computational limitations. If these agents agree that their estimates are consistent with …
Common Knowledge in Game Theory
L Ménager - Revue économique, 2023 - cairn.info
When something is known to all and everybody knows that it is known to all, everybody
knows that everybody knows that it is known to all and so on ad infinitum, this thing is said to …
knows that everybody knows that it is known to all and so on ad infinitum, this thing is said to …
On loss aversion, level-1 reasoning, and betting
Previous research suggests that human reaction to risky opportunities reflects two
contradicting biases:“loss aversion”, and “limited level of reasoning” that leads to …
contradicting biases:“loss aversion”, and “limited level of reasoning” that leads to …