This review summarizes a nascent body of theoretical research on design of incentives
when the environment is not fully known to the designer and offers some general lessons …

Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on
package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes …

Providing a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new
applications, this book is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided …

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield
inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous …

Economists, psychologists, and marketers are interested in determining the monetary value
people place on non-market goods for a variety of reasons: to carry out cost-benefit analysis …

The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment
among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying mechanism design on …

This article proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous
commodities. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of commodities among n bidders …

The game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative
framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of …

Robert Wilson criticizes applied game theory's reliance on common-knowledge
assumptions. In reaction to Wilson's critique, the recent literature of mechanism design has …

Auction theory is of central importance in the study of markets. Unfortunately, we do not
know equilibrium bidding strategies for most auction games. For realistic markets with …