The levels metaphor is ubiquitous in our descriptions of science and the world. So simple
and elegant, the metaphor takes an apparently heterogeneous collection of objects and …

One can explain the behavior of the whole in terms of the organized behaviors of its parts,
and one can explain the behaviors of the parts in terms of the organized behaviors of their …

By treating colours as sui generis intrinsic properties of objects we can maintain that (1)
colours are causally responsible for colour experiences (and so agree with the physicalist) …

Developing original accounts of the many aspects of belief, On Believing puts the believer at
the heart of the story. Hunter argues that to believe something is to be in position to do, think …

It is generally accepted that the most serious threat to the possibility of mental causation is
posed by the causal self-sufficiency of physical causal processes. I argue, however, that this …

The thesis that mental states are physical states enjoys widespread popularity. After the
abandonment of typeidentity theories, however, this thesis has typically been framed in …

Why is there anything, rather than nothing at all? This question often serves as a debating
tactic used by theists to attack naturalism. Many people apparently regard the question …

Contemporary philosophy of mind has tended to make the believer disappear. In response,
Matt Boyle and Pamela Hieronymi have argued that believing is an act or activity, not a …

In this paper, I aim to intervene in the debate about sortalism (the view that individuating a
particular object necessarily involves classifying it according to its kind) but to do so in a way …

This chapter argues that in making up her own mind a person becomes responsible for
believing what she does. It offers an account of inference as a mental action that grounds …