This paper surveys two related pieces of the labor-economics literature: incentive pay and
careers in organizations. In the discussion of incentives, I first summarize theory and …

From the first, specialization and coordination have presented governments with a
conundrum: specialized program might be best for delivering one service to the public, but …

Organizations are the building blocks of governments. The role of organizations, formal and
informal, is most readily apparent in public bureaucracy, but all the institutions of the public …

In this chapter, the authors take issue with both the prevailing principal-agent model of the
public corporation and the shareholder wealth maximization goal that underlies it. Because …

This paper identifies and evaluates rationales for team participation and for the effects of
team composition on productivity using novel data from a garment plant that shifted from …

We examine the joint effects of task interdependence and reward interdependence on group
behavior and performance. We develop a model that predicts that task and reward …

Much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one
transaction. This static assumption is not only unrealistic, but the resulting predictions …

It is surely appropriate that the John R. Commons lecture would someday be given on the
subject of Institutions. Anyone who goes back to read The Legal Foundations of Capital ism …

It is well known that comparative performance information (CPI) can enhance efficiency in
static principal-agent relationships by improving the trade-off between insurance and …

This paper analyzes whether the two tasks of building infrastructures which are socially
useful in providing public services and managing these assets should be bundled or not …