We study bilateral trade between two strategic agents. The celebrated result of Myerson and
Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and weakly …

We consider the bilateral trade problem, in which two agents trade a single indivisible item. It
is known that the only dominant-strategy truthful mechanism is the fixed-price mechanism …

We study the two-agent single-item bilateral trade. Ideally, the trade should happen
whenever the buyer's value for the item exceeds the seller's cost. However, the classical …

We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can
exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as …

We study the problem of social welfare maximization in bilateral trade, where two agents, a
buyer and a seller, trade an indivisible item. The seminal result of Myerson and Satterthwaite …

We investigate non-adaptive algorithms for matroid prophet inequalities. Matroid prophet
inequalities have been considered resolved since 2012 when [KW12] introduced thresholds …

We continue the study of the performance for fixed-price mechanisms in the bilateral trade
problem, and improve approximation ratios of welfare-optimal mechanisms in several …

We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there
are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally …

We consider the problem of maximizing the gains from trade (GFT) in two-sided markets.
The seminal impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that even for …

Bilateral trade is one of the most natural and important forms of economic interaction: A
seller has a single, indivisible item for sale, and a buyer is potentially interested. The two …