We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants annot be
assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest. As such pxticipants, termed …

We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are
constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures …

Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This
paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well …

In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design,\citet {NR99}
studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on …

We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to
algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving …

This article surveys recent work with an algorithmic flavor in Bayesian mechanism design.
Bayesian mechanism design involves optimization in economic settings where the designer …

This paper provides a literature overview on (direct revelation) algorithmic mechanism
design in the context of machine scheduling problems. Here, one takes a game-theoretic …

We introduce a novel pricing and resource allocation approach for batch jobs on cloud
systems. In our economic model, users submit jobs with a value function that specifies …

We provide a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism
design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results …

Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values
and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a …