Fundamental Volatility and Financial Stability
G Desgranges, S Gauthier - 2023 - shs.hal.science
Financial investors choose the capital they invest into risky firms based on the return they
expect. The actual return depends on fundamental shocks and the aggregate investment …
expect. The actual return depends on fundamental shocks and the aggregate investment …
Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination With Private Values
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to
communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games …
communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games …
Spelteoretisk jämvikt som ett resultat av inlärning eller evolution
E Mohlin - Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 2020 - journals.lub.lu.se
One way of justifying the use of equilibrium concepts in game theory is by appeal to learning
or evolution. This paper provides a non-technical introduction to evolutionary game theory. A …
or evolution. This paper provides a non-technical introduction to evolutionary game theory. A …
Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to
communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games …
communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games …
Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (Extended Version)
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to
communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games …
communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games …