Unbundling corruption: Revisiting six questions on corruption
YY Ang - Global Perspectives, 2020 - online.ucpress.edu
Corruption is conventionally measured in global indices as a one-dimensional problem—
one score for every country—a practice that has profoundly shaped our conceptualization of …
one score for every country—a practice that has profoundly shaped our conceptualization of …
An experiment on corruption and gender
MF Rivas - Bulletin of Economic Research, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
ABSTRACT A number of papers with field data have found differences in the corrupt
activities of males and females; nonetheless they have drawbacks that may be overcome in …
activities of males and females; nonetheless they have drawbacks that may be overcome in …
Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes
K Abbink, U Dasgupta, L Gangadharan… - Journal of Public …, 2014 - Elsevier
This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment
bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers …
bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers …
Gender and corruption: Lessons from laboratory corruption experiments
B Frank, JG Lambsdorff, F Boehm - The European Journal of …, 2011 - Springer
Reliable microdata on corrupt behavior are hard to obtain in the field, and available field
data are hard to interpret. Laboratory corruption experiments have therefore recently gained …
data are hard to interpret. Laboratory corruption experiments have therefore recently gained …
In-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in naturally occurring groups
K Abbink, D Harris - PloS one, 2019 - journals.plos.org
We study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game in
a naturally occuring group setting. An allocator divides a large sum of money among three …
a naturally occuring group setting. An allocator divides a large sum of money among three …
Combining top-down and bottom-up accountability: evidence from a bribery experiment
D Serra - The journal of law, economics, & organization, 2012 - academic.oup.com
Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions acting on the probability of
external controls or the severity of punishment. An alternative approach to fighting corruption …
external controls or the severity of punishment. An alternative approach to fighting corruption …
Chapter 4 anticorruption policies: Lessons from the lab
K Abbink, D Serra - New advances in experimental research on …, 2012 - emerald.com
We review the existing laboratory experimental studies on corruption that have generated
results with clear policy implications. We present and discuss experimental findings on the …
results with clear policy implications. We present and discuss experimental findings on the …
Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment
Anecdotal evidence suggests that intermediaries are ubiquitous in corrupt activities;
however, empirical evidence on their role as facilitators of corrupt transactions is scarce …
however, empirical evidence on their role as facilitators of corrupt transactions is scarce …
The effect of social norms on bribe offers
K Abbink, E Freidin, L Gangadharan… - The Journal of Law …, 2018 - academic.oup.com
We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms
among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were …
among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were …
Anti-bribery and corruption policies in international sports governing bodies
C Philippou, T Hines - Frontiers in Sports and Active Living, 2021 - frontiersin.org
International Sports Governing Bodies (“ISGBs”) are diverse in their aims but share a need
to maintain a reputation of accountability in the eyes of their stakeholders. While some …
to maintain a reputation of accountability in the eyes of their stakeholders. While some …