We use supervisory loan-level data to document that small firms (SMEs) obtain shorter
maturity credit lines than large firms, post more collateral, have higher utilization rates, and …

Abstract Information, which can arrive in multiple forms, is a fundamental component of all
financial transactions and markets. We define hard and soft information and describe the …

We directly measure banks' monitoring of syndicated loans. Banks typically demand
borrower information on at least a monthly basis. About 20% of loans involve active …

We challenge theories that lead arrangers retain shares of syndicated loans to overcome
information asymmetries. Lead arrangers frequently sell their entire loan stake—in over 50 …

Monitoring is one of the main activities explaining the existence of banks, yet empirical
evidence about its effect on loan outcomes is scant. Using granular loan-level information …

We use a threshold-based design to study ex post discretion in lenders' contractual
enforcement of covenant violations. At preset thresholds, lenders enforce contractual …

This article documents novel large-sample evidence on the informational role of interfirm
ownership networks in bank lending. Using comprehensive loan-level data in China, we find …

The lead arrangers of syndicated loans often have lending relationships with the borrowers,
while other lenders participating in the syndicate largely engage in an arm's length …

We exploit novel data on corporate loan officers and a new measure of inattention to study
the effect of distraction on syndicated lending outcomes. We use within-banker variation in …

Theoretically, bank's loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalization. To proxy
for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers' investment following loan covenant …