A well-known result about market power in emission permit markets is that efficiency can be
achieved by full free allocation to the dominant firm. I show that this result breaks down when …

We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution
permits that can be traded in a secondary spot market. Low and high emitters compete for …

Market power in permit markets has been examined in some detail following the seminal
work of Hahn (QJ Econ 99 (4): 753–765, 1984), but the effect of free allocation on price …

We propose an emission cap adjustment policy for an emission trading system (ETS) that
allows banking of allowances for later use and faces business cycle uncertainty. The forward …

We investigate the effect of tradable emission permits with banking on the production–
inventory strategy of a firm in this paper. The basis of the work is the well-known Arrow …

Several existing or proposed climate policies have considered bankable permits in a cap-
and-trade (C&T) program that covers beyond a single sector, eg, electric power, or allows …

We consider a pollution permit market with a large firm and fringe of competitive firms. To
smooth compliance towards a long-run emissions goal, firms are initially allocated a stock …

An emissions trading scheme (ETS) is an artificially created market that transforms the right
to pollute the environment from a production factor in unlimited supply into a scarce …

We examine the influence of carbon permit allocation rules on market structure in a Cournot
duopoly market. This study demonstrates that the benchmark allocation rule is more efficient …

Economists argue that policymakers should take advantage of market principles in
designing environmental regulations. Such market-based approaches–environmental taxes …