We study sequential bargaining between a proposer and a veto player. Both have single‐
peaked preferences, but the proposer is uncertain about the veto player's ideal point. The …

This paper studies majoritarian reputational bargaining. Three agents bargain over the
division of one dollar under majority rule, and proposers are randomly chosen. Each agent …

An agenda-setter proposes a spatial policy to voters and can revise the initial proposal if it
gets rejected. Voters can communicate with each other and have distinct but correlated …

We present a two-period collective bargaining model with asymmetric information and a
persistent agenda setter. Voters have private information about their policy preferences …

We analyze a two-period collective bargaining game with asymmetric information and a
persistent agenda setter. Committee members (ie, voters) have private information about …

This collection of essays study how institutions shape incentives for communication in
collective bargaining where players have private information about their private values …