In recent years there has been a significant increase of interest in continuous-time Principal-
Agent models, or contract theory, and their applications. Continuous-time models provide a …

Optimal tax design attempts to resolve a well-known trade-off: namely, that high taxes are
bad insofar as they discourage people from working, but good to the degree that, by …

This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents
have private information that is persistent. In particular, I focus on a continuous‐time version …

We study a continuous‐time contracting problem under hidden action, where the principal
has ambiguous beliefs about the project cash flows. The principal designs a robust contract …

We develop a dynamic theory of managerial turnover in a world in which the quality of the
match between a firm and its managers changes stochastically over time. Shocks to …

We introduce uncertainty into to study optimal long-term contracting with learning. In a
dynamic relationship, the agent's shirking not only reduces current performance, but also …

We study the optimal incentive scheme for a multistage project in which the agent privately
observes intermediate progress. The optimal contract involves a soft deadline wherein the …

This article studies efficient allocations in a dynamic private information economy with a
continuum of idiosyncratic shocks that are persistent. I develop a first-order approach for this …

We explore the conditions under which the “first‐order approach”(FO approach) can be used
to characterize profit maximizing contracts in dynamic principal–agent models. The FO …

We introduce a tractable dynamic monitoring technology into a continuous-time moral-
hazard problem and study the optimal long-term contract between principal and agent …