First, the paper lays out the fun-damental assumptions underlying the game theoretical
analysis of international environmental problems. Second it summarises important findings …

We survey the economics literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We
classify the extant literature into the following categories: pure IEA games without linkages …

In recent years, the number of publications that analyze the formation and stability of
international environmental agreements (IEAs) using the method of game theory has sharply …

Concern about international environmental problems 1 has grown immensely over the last
four decades. This lead to the signature of several international environmental agreements …

This paper addresses the subject of self-enforcing international environmental agreements
(IEAs). The standard model of IEAs is adapted to include uncertainty in environmental costs …

Most noncooperative game theoretic models of international environmental agreements
(IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation. In this paper …

This chapter surveys existing results and lists nine future areas in TU oligopoly games and
industrial cooperation or, precisely, cooperative oligopoly games with transferable utilities …

International rivers are a substantial source of the world's freshwater supply. The resulting
interdependence between nations leads to resOurce conflicts as upstream nations impose …

This paper makes three corrections in the literature by restating three little-known and yet
still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley: 1) Shapley (1955), not Gillies, 1953, Gillies …

Many researchers have found game theory a useful method for analyzing international
environmental problems. However, game theory has been criticized for being too theoretical …