The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with
strict preferences. We introduce maximum irreversible matchings and consider almost stable …

We consider hedonic coalition formation games with variable sets of agents and extend the
properties competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity (introduced by Klaus, Games Econ …

A Monte Carlo method was used in this paper to investigate the properties of hedonic
games. Hedonic games or coalition formation games are important in cooperative game …

In this paper, we study the core of two-sided, one-to-one matching problems. First, in a
model in which agents have strict preferences over their potential mates and are allowed to …

For classical marriage markets with equal numbers of men and women and where all men
find all women acceptable and all women find all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) …

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs
or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources …

This dissertation consists of three chapters on topics in microeconomic theory. In Chapter 1, I
study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a …

Classical roommate problems define individual rationality by conceiving remaining single as
the “outside option”. This conception implicitly assumes that there are always some empty …

We propose a new axiom called “own-side singles monotonicity” in one-to-one matching
problems between men and women. Suppose that there is an agent who is not matched in a …

The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict
references. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable …