The idea of representation has been central in discussions of intentionality for many years.
But only more recently has it begun playing a wider role in the philosophy of mind …

The knowledge argument aims to establish that conscious experience involves non-physical
properties. It rests on the idea that someone who has complete physical knowledge about …

Can we learn from literature what it is like to have an experience (WIL-knowledge) of a kind
we never had before? It seems to be a quite common idea outside academic debates that …

We have various everyday measures for identifying the presence of consciousness, such as
the capacity for verbal report and the intentional control of behavior. However, there are …

It is often said that normative properties are “just too different” to reduce to other kinds of
properties. This suggests that many philosophers find it difficult to believe reductive theses in …

In recent literature on the metaphysics of consciousness, and in particular on the prospects
of physicalism, there are two interesting strands of discussion. One strand concerns the so …

Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal
consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of …

Suffering, I argue, is bad. This paper supports that claim by defending a somewhat bolder-
sounding one: namely that if anyone—even a sadistic 'amoralist'—fully understands the fact …

Moral contextualism about “ought”-sentences is a semantic thesis that takes the content of
moral “ought” to be a function of contextually relevant parameters. I aim to provide a theory …

The knowledge argument is something that is both an ideal for philosophy and yet
surprisingly rare: a simple, valid argument for an interesting and important conclusion, with …