Cooperative AI via Decentralized Commitment Devices

X Sun, D Crapis, M Stephenson, B Monnot… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2023 - arxiv.org
Credible commitment devices have been a popular approach for robust multi-agent
coordination. However, existing commitment mechanisms face limitations like privacy …

Breaking the Balance of Power: Commitment Attacks on Ethereum's Reward Mechanism

R Sarenche, EN Tas, B Monnot… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
Validators in permissionless, large-scale blockchains (eg, Ethereum) are typically payoff-
maximizing, rational actors. Ethereum relies on in-protocol incentives, like rewards for …

Stackelberg Attack on Protocol Fee Governance

A Hajjar - … Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain …, 2024 - Springer
We establish a Stackelberg attack by Liquidity Providers against Governance of an AMM,
leveraging forking and commitments through a Grim Forker smart contract. We produce a …

Which Games are Unaffected by Absolute Commitments?

D Landis, NI Schwartzbach - arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.04373, 2023 - arxiv.org
We identify a subtle security issue that impacts mechanism design in scenarios in which
agents can absolutely commit to strategies. Absolute commitments allow the strategy of an …

Stackelberg Attack on Protocol Fee

A Hajjar - Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy: 5th … - books.google.com
We establish a Stackelberg attack by Liquidity Providers against Gov-ernance of an AMM,
leveraging forking and commitments through a Grim Forker smart contract. We produce a …