This book in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect
competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect …

In many sequential auctions supply is unknown ex ante. Consequently, price formation
depends on information regarding supply: uncertain supply reduces the 'option value'and …

This paper examines whether a first-price, sealed-bid auction is efficient in allocating a
process innovation amongst oligopolists engaged in either Cournot or Bertrand competition …

Theoretical models of information asymmetry have identified a trade-off between the desire
to learn and the desire to prevent an opponent from learning private information. This paper …

The same contestants often meet repeatedly in contests. Behavior in a contest potentially
provides information with regard to one's type and can therefore influence the behavior of …

We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one
auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical …

We show how to numerically solve for a Markov‐perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction
game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity …

A large body of empirical research has shown that prices of identical goods sold
sequentially sometimes increase and often decline across rounds. This article introduces a …

We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are complements
or substitutes. A sequential English auction model determines the estimating structural …

This article examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road
construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated …