This chapter is about relational contracts, agreements for which the ongoing relationship
between the parties plays an essential role in determining what happens. Its concern is with …

Managed organizations serve both to coordinate the decisions and actions of individuals
and groups and to motivate these people to perform the needed activities. This chapter …

We study optimal dynamic contracting for a firm with multiple workers where compensation
is based on public performance signals and privately reported peer evaluations. We show …

This paper proposes a new approach to equilibrium selection in repeated games with
transfers, supposing that in each period the players bargain over how to play. Although the …

Teams are becoming increasingly important in work settings. We develop a framework to
study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members …

This chapter reviews the literature on the theory of relational incentive contracts. It motivates
the discussion by the classic applications of relational contracts to the GM-Fisher Body …

We study optimal team design. In our model, a principal assigns either heterogeneous
agents to a team (a diverse team) or homogenous agents to a team (a specialized team) to …

We study a dynamic multi-agent model with a verifiable team performance measure and non-
verifiable individual measures. The optimal contract can be interpreted as an explicit …

What is the most efficient way of designing incentives in an organization? Over the past five
decades, agency theory has provided various answers to this crucial question. This line of …

For om lag 10 år siden flatet produktivitetsutviklingen ut i norsk økonomi, etter en 10-
årsperiode med høy produktivitetsvekst. Fallet i produktivitetsutviklingen har sammenfalt …