Group Incentive-Compatible Allocation of Discrete Resources When Ownership is Partitioned
W Ishida, C Park - Available at SSRN 4832592, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
We introduce and study the problem of allocating objects when the ownership structure is of
the following form: Society is partitioned into groups of agents, each collectively owning a …
the following form: Society is partitioned into groups of agents, each collectively owning a …
The property rights theory of production networks
I Balbuzanov, MH Kotowski - 2019 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper investigates the formation of production and trading networks in economies with
general interdependencies and complex property rights. We argue that the right to exclude …
general interdependencies and complex property rights. We argue that the right to exclude …
Essays on Economic Design
W Ishida - 2024 - search.proquest.com
This dissertation consists of three essays studying different aspects of “Economic Design.”
The first chapter focuses on one-to-several matching problems, the second chapter studies a …
The first chapter focuses on one-to-several matching problems, the second chapter studies a …