We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …

We study bilateral trade between two strategic agents. The celebrated result of Myerson and
Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and weakly …

In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which
the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outcome …

A celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that any truthful
mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resulting …

We develop and extend a line of recent work on the design of mechanisms for two-sided
markets. The markets we consider consist of buyers and sellers of a number of items, and …

We consider the bilateral trade problem, in which two agents trade a single indivisible item. It
is known that the only dominant-strategy truthful mechanism is the fixed-price mechanism …

In ZK-Rollups, provers spend significant computational resources to generate validity proofs.
Their costs should be compensated properly, so a sustainable prover market can form over …

We study the problem of designing dynamic double auctions for two-sided markets in which
a platform intermediates the trade between one seller offering independent items to multiple …

We consider the problem of welfare (and gains-from-trade) maximization in two-sided
markets using simple mechanisms that are prior-independent. The seminal impossibility …

We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can
exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as …