We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with
combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by …

In online combinatorial auctions m indivisible items are to be allocated to n agents who
arrive online. Agents have random valuations for the different subsets of items and the goal …

The secretary and the prophet inequality problems are central to the field of Stopping
Theory. Recently, there has been a lot of work in generalizing these models to multiple items …

Over the past decade, an exciting connection has developed between the theory of posted-
price mechanisms and the prophet inequality, a result from the theory of optimal stopping …

We consider the classic principal-agent model of contract theory, in which a principal
designs an outcome-dependent compensation scheme to incentivize an agent to take a …

We study the single-choice Prophet Inequality problem when the gambler is given access to
samples. We show that the optimal competitive ratio of $1/2$ can be achieved with a single …

We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller with n heterogeneous items for sale
to a single buyer whose valuation function for sets of items is unknown and drawn from …

A central object in optimal stopping theory is the single-choice prophet inequality for
independent, identically distributed random variables: given a sequence of random …

We survey the main results from [Dütting, Kesselheim, and Lucier 2020]: 1 a simple posted-
price mechanism for subadditive combinatorial auctions with m items that achieves an O (log …

In the Prophet Secretary problem, samples from a known set of probability distributions
arrive one by one in a uniformly random order, and an algorithm must irrevocably pick one of …