Social norms are patterns of behavior that are self-enforcing within a group: Everyone
conforms, everyone is expected to conform, and everyone wants to conform when they …

Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to
simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of …

Abstract 'Noise'in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations
from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on …

Our theory of cultural-institutional persistence and innovation is based on uncoordinated
updating of individual social norms and contracts, so that both culture and institutions co …

This paper describes an experiment designed to test which, if any, stochastic adjustment
dynamic most accurately captures the behaviour of a large population. The setting is a large …

Differences in social norms are a key source of behavioral variation among human
populations. It is widely assumed that a vast range of behaviors, even deleterious ones, can …

When coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional
bias in agents' non-best response behavior, we show that the Egalitarian bargaining …

We study the long-run conventions emerging in a stag-hunt game when agents are myopic
best responders. Our main novel assumption is that errors converge to zero at a rate that is …

This paper takes the idea of coalitional behavior–groups of people occasionally acting
together to their mutual benefit–and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game …

This study considers waiting times for populations to achieve efficient social coordination.
Belloc and Bowles [1] conjecture that coalitional behavior will hasten such coordination. This …