We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by
observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions …

We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation
when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class …

This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-
strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The payoff set of this class of …

We study the repeated two-player Prisoners' Dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and
no communication. Letting the discount factor go to one and holding the monitoring structure …

This paper studies an infinite‐horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single
principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' …

We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by
observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions …

We prove a folk theorem for stochastic games with private, almost-perfect monitoring and
observable states when the limit set of feasible and individually rational payoffs is …

Abstract We prove a Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated private monitoring games with
virtually enforceable actions. In these monitoring situations with scarce signals, players need …

We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation
when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class …

This dissertation advocates dynamic mechanism design as a useful tool to tackle theoretical
challenges in microeconomics and to solve real world institutional design problems. It is …