We study the extent to which information can be used to extract attention from a decision
maker (DM). All feasible stopping times $\unicode {x2013} $ random times DM stops paying …

This paper introduces flexible endogenous monitoring in dynamic moral hazard. A principal
can commit to not only an employment plan but also the monitoring technology to incentivize …

We analyze how uncertain technologies should be robustly regulated. An agent develops a
new technology and, while privately learning about its harms and benefits, continually …

An analyst observes an agent take a sequence of actions. The analyst does not have access
to the agent's information and ponders whether the observed actions could be justified …

The exchange of information for attention is an increasingly important transaction in modern
economies. Online and offline, information is offered to attract attention and to be consulted …

We provide a unified analysis of how dynamic information should be designed in optimal
stopping problems: a principal controls the flow of information about a payoff relevant state …

We analyze the dynamic tradeoff between the generation and the disclosure of evidence.
Agents are tempted to delay investing in a new technology in order to learn from information …

A principal seeks to learn about a binary state and can do so by enlisting an agent to acquire
information over time using a Poisson information arrival technology. The agent learns about …

I study a principal-agent model in which a principal hires an agent to collect information
about an unknown continuous state. The agent acquires a signal whose distribution is …

We fully characterize the possible outcomes of exploration and stopping: all statetime joint
distributions achieved by stopping some martingale process with bounded variation …