The field of optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, as well
as several killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from …

We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …

A principal wishes to screen an agent along several dimensions of private information
simultaneously. The agent has quasilinear preferences that are additively separable across …

Maximizing the revenue from selling more than one good (or item) to a single buyer is a
notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show …

We present a general framework for proving polynomial sample complexity bounds for the
problem of learning from samples the best auction in a class of “simple” auctions. Our …

We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-
bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results …

We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design,
including the black-box reductions of Cai et. al., simple auctions for additive buyers, and …

We survey the main results from [Dütting, Kesselheim, and Lucier 2020]: 1 a simple posted-
price mechanism for subadditive combinatorial auctions with m items that achieves an O (log …

We introduce a novel framework of Prophet Inequalities for combinatorial valuation
functions. For a (n on-monotone) submodular objective function over an arbitrary matroid …

We consider the menu size of auctions and mechanisms in general as a measure of their
complexity, and study how it affects revenue. Our setting has a single revenue-maximizing …