We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in
which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the heart …

In online combinatorial auctions m indivisible items are to be allocated to n agents who
arrive online. Agents have random valuations for the different subsets of items and the goal …

We survey the main results from [Dütting, Kesselheim, and Lucier 2020]: 1 a simple posted-
price mechanism for subadditive combinatorial auctions with m items that achieves an O (log …

We consider a fundamental pricing problem in combinatorial auctions. We are given a set of
indivisible items and a set of buyers with randomly drawn monotone valuations over subsets …

A longstanding open problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to design computationally-
efficient truthful mechanisms for (approximately) maximizing welfare in combinatorial …

A celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that any truthful
mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resulting …

In this work, we study the maximin share fairness notion (MMS) for allocation of indivisible
goods in the subadditive and fractionally subadditive settings. While previous work refutes …

Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design,
paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper …

Prophet inequalities and secretary problems have been extensively studied in recent years
due to their elegance, connections to online algorithms, stochastic optimization, and …

We consider an online multi-weighted generalization of several classic online optimization
problems called the online combinatorial assignment problem. We are given an …