Formal contracting addresses the moral hazard problems inherent in interfirm deals via
explicit terms designed to achieve incentive alignment. Alternatively, when firms expect to …

This chapter is about relational contracts, agreements for which the ongoing relationship
between the parties plays an essential role in determining what happens. Its concern is with …

This article describes the emerging game-theoretic framework for modeling long-term
contractual relationships with moral hazard. The framework combines self-enforcement and …

Principal-agent models usually invoke the strong assumption that the parties know for sure
ex ante whether a variable is verifiable or not. This paper assumes that only the probability …

This chapter reviews the literature on the theory of relational incentive contracts. It motivates
the discussion by the classic applications of relational contracts to the GM-Fisher Body …

We study relational contracting and renegotiation in environments with external enforcement
of long-term contractual arrangements. A long-term contract governs the stage games that …

This paper analyzes a risk sharing incomplete contract under which an airline agrees to
serve an airport in exchange for payment to/from the airport based on the difference …

Die ökonomischen Vorteile der Spezialisierung haben Wirtschaftssysteme entstehen lassen,
die sich durch Arbeitsteilung auszeichnen. Arbeitsteilung bedeutet, dass eine …

We develop a theory of contracts with limited enforcement in the context of a dynamic
relationship. The seller is privately informed on his persistent cost, while the buyer remains …

В статье рассматриваются специфические кооперативные инвестиции, которые в
отличие от эгоистических инвестиций, традиционно анализируемых в …