We examine learning behaviour in auction and fair division experiments with independent
private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants play all four …

In this paper we study equilibrium and experimental bidding behaviour in first-price and
second-price auctions with outside options. We find that bidders do respond to outside …

The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid
auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We …

We experimentally compare two partnership dissolution mechanisms, the widely-used buy–
sell clause and the winner's bid auction. While standard theory does well in organizing many …

The paper focuses on a comparative investigation of the standard one-bid first-price auction
and a corresponding two-bid auction where each buyer may place two bids: a high-bid and …

Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not
trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) …

Reverse auctions are used in various fields by public or corporate buyers to purchase goods
and services from multiple sellers at the best price. Unlike in selling auctions, in reverse …

Partnerships form and dissolve. Dissolution often requires a change in property rights, from
joint to single ownership, in the hands of one of the partners. This calls for a dissolution rule …

This thesis comprises three chapters that investigate bidding behaviour and efficiency in first-
price sealed-bid auctions (FPA) with independent private values (IPV) when the underlying …

We introduce and experimentally test an auction model that allows for outside options of
bidders as substitutes for the auctioned object under the private values assumption …