In this monograph we perform an in-depth analysis of 199 constitutional texts to single out
the provisions that, by enhancing economic freedom in a country, are likely to create the …

We investigate the effects of fee-shifting in an experimental litigation game. In our setup, a
defendant may cause harm to a plaintiff. The defendant can take precautions to lower the …

When adjudication is not perfectly accurate, litigants with unmeritorious cases may benefit
from court errors, which in turn may result in a dilution of incentives for primary behavior and …

In this paper, we conduct an experiment in order to explore how the legal fee arrangement
(ie flat or contingent fees) and the trial costs allocation rule (ie American or English rule) may …

This paper analyzes how the plaintiff selects her lawyer based on lawyers' confidence in
their trial-effort productivity. The plaintiff's lawyer works on a contingent fee and makes …

This paper studies how litigation and settlement behavior is affected by agents motivated by
spiteful preferences under the American and the English fee-shifting rule. We conduct an …

We investigate the impact of observability of contracts between a plaintiff and his attorney on
both the efficiency of the environmental conflict and the fairness of the resulting outcome …

Abstract In 1999 Gordon Tullock became Professor at the George Mason University Law
School. Tullock's arrival at George Mason brought the economics department and the law …

We model civil litigation as a simultaneous contest between a plaintiff and a defendant who
have monetary and emotional preferences. The litigants' emotional variables capture a non …

Following a recent wave of deregulation, lawyers now use a large variety of media to
advertise their services. A common argument against this increasing reliance on advertising …