We find that the losers in CEO promotion tournaments sell their equity holdings profitably to
mitigate the reductions in the promotion‐based component of their contracts. They avoid …

To contain bankers' risk-shifting behavior, policymakers use a variety of tools. Among them,
mandating the use of default-linked (ie, debt-like) pay features prominently, typically in the …

To contain bankers' risk-shifting behavior, policymakers use a variety of tools. Among them,
mandating the use of default-linked (ie, debt-like) pay features prominently, typically in the …

Corporate insiders, such as CEOs, CFOs and other senior managers, are commonly
recognised in the stock market as possessors of private information about the future …

In this paper, we first establish a VAR model, screen the variables using the CSIS method so
as to achieve fast dimensionality reduction, and use the cointegration theory to model non …

We find that several non-promoted executives remain in their firm after losing CEO
tournament contests and suffering a drastic reduction in their contract's promotion-based …

We investigate the impact of temporal deferral in personal income tax payments on
executives' inclination to use private information for insider trading, enhancing the influence …

Tournament incentives and insider trading Page 1 1 Tournament incentives and insider
trading Xiaoke Ye1 Bayes Business School, City, University of London, 106 Bunhill Row …