Suppose that providing incentives for a group of individuals in a strategic context requires a
monitor to detect their deviations. What about the monitor's deviations? To address this …

Abstract Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and
conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, so-called zero …

Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring | The Review of Economic Studies |
Oxford Academic Skip to Main Content Advertisement Oxford Academic Journals Books Search …

This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic
games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally …

It is conventional wisdom that transparency in cartels—monitoring of competitors' prices,
sales, and profits—facilitates collusion. However, in several recent cases cartels have …

We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the
Pareto frontier of) the sequential equilibrium payoff set at a fixed discount factor in two …

Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring have a wide range of applications, but a
complete characterization of all equilibria in this class of games has yet to be obtained. The …

We study dynamic signalling when the sender does not see the signals that her actions
generate. The sender then uses her past play to forecast what a receiver believes, in turn …

This paper studies long term relationships, modeled as repeated games, with restricted
feedback. Players condition current play on summary statistics of past play rather than the …

We consider a dynamic inspection problem between a principal and several agents. The
principal observes the full inspection history, whereas each agent only observes inspections …