Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity

E Fehr, S Gächter - Journal of economic perspectives, 2000 - aeaweb.org
This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is
an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances …

Promises and partnership

G Charness, M Dufwenberg - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our
design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with …

Has agency theory run its course?: Making the theory more flexible to inform the management of reward systems

G Cuevas‐Rodríguez, LR Gomez‐Mejia… - Corporate …, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Manuscript Type Conceptual Research Question/Issue In this paper we discuss
three assumptions of agency theory:(1) conflicts of interest between principal and agent,(2) …

Does familiarity breed trust? Revisiting the antecedents of trust

R Gulati, M Sytch - Managerial and Decision Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
This paper investigates how the history of interaction between organizations and between
organizational boundary spanners contributes to the formation of trust between firms. Our …

Fairness and contract design

E Fehr, A Klein, KM Schmidt - Econometrica, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual
and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a …

Reputation and reciprocity: Consequences for the labour relation

S Gächter, A Falk - Scandinavian journal of economics, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations.
However, many of these relationships are long term and provide repeated game incentives …

A reexamination of agency theory assumptions: extensions and extrapolations

P Wright, A Mukherji, MJ Kroll - The Journal of Socio-Economics, 2001 - Elsevier
In this paper, we discuss agency theory in the context of the individual principal and agent,
and also in the context of the organization and its groups. Agency theory is examined in the …

[图书][B] The economics of contracts: Theories and applications

E Brousseau, JM Glachant - 2002 - books.google.com
A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms
of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the …

Moral hazard and other-regarding preferences

H Itoh - The Japanese Economic Review, 2004 - Springer
The paper aims at obtaining new theoretical insights by combining the standard moral
hazard models of principal–agent relationships with theories of other-regarding prefer¬ …

Fairness and incentives in a multi‐task principal–agent model

E Fehr, KM Schmidt - The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
This paper reports on a two‐task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is
contractible. The principal can either offer a piece‐rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the …