Financial constraints preclude many surplus producing economic transactions, and inhibit
the growth of many others. This paper models financial constraints as the interaction of two …

This paper studies the design of efficient mechanisms for repeated bilateral trade in settings
where (i) traders' values and costs evolve randomly with time, and (ii) the traders become …

We modify the dynamic pivot mechanism of Bergemann and Välimäki (Econometrica, 2010)
in such a way that lump-sum fees are collected from the players. We show that the modified …

Lectures on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design Page 1 Lectures on Dynamic
Contracts and Mechanism Design to be delivered at the Department of Economics and …

An underlying assumption in many principal agent models and its applications is that the
agent has some private information and principal has the bargaining power of setting …

One of the new ideas to reduce inequality and adjust the class gap is the" sharing economy"
model. By creating" access instead of ownership", the sharing economy has provided the …

This paper studies the design of e¢ cient mechanisms for repeated trade in settings where (i)
tradersvalues and costs evolve randomly with time, and (ii) the traders become ready and …