This chapter surveys the theoretical literature on statistical discrimination and affirmative
action. This literature suggests different explanations for the existence and persistence of …

A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism.
Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer …

COVID-19 has revealed limitations of existing mechanisms for rationing medical resources
under emergency scenarios. Many argue that these mechanisms abandon various ethical …

We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the
college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and …

The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among
efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze …

The prevalent affirmative action policy in school choice limits the number of admitted
majority students to give minority students higher chances to attend their desired schools …

Randomization is commonplace in everyday resource allocation. We generalize the theory
of randomized assignment to accommodate multi-unit allocations and various real-world …

Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving parents selection options while
maintaining diversity of different student types. In practice, diversity constraints are often …

In several school choice districts in the United States, the student proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in priority orders are broken in some …

Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often
take the form of restrictions on the numbers of agents on one side of the market matched to …