Electoral and partisan cycles in economic policies and outcomes
RJ Franzese Jr - Annual review of political science, 2002 - annualreviews.org
▪ Abstract Policy makers in democracies have strong partisan and electoral incentives
regarding the amount, nature, and timing of economic-policy activity. Given these incentives …
regarding the amount, nature, and timing of economic-policy activity. Given these incentives …
Democracy, public expenditures, and the poor: understanding political incentives for providing public services
The incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods and reduce poverty vary across
countries. Even in democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to …
countries. Even in democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to …
Unbundling institutions
D Acemoglu, S Johnson - Journal of political Economy, 2005 - journals.uchicago.edu
This paper evaluates the importance of “property rights institutions,” which protect citizens
against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and “contracting institutions,” …
against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and “contracting institutions,” …
[图书][B] Public choice III
DC Mueller - 2003 - books.google.com
This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). As
in the previous additions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include …
in the previous additions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include …
Why doesn't the US have a European-style welfare system?
AF Alesina, EL Glaeser, B Sacerdote - 2001 - nber.org
European countries are much more generous to the poor relative to the US level of
generosity. Economic models suggest that redistribution is a function of the variance and …
generosity. Economic models suggest that redistribution is a function of the variance and …
Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others
Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard
(1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across …
(1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across …
The impact of competition on management quality: evidence from public hospitals
We analyse the causal impact of competition on managerial quality and hospital
performance. To address the endogeneity of market structure we analyse the English public …
performance. To address the endogeneity of market structure we analyse the English public …
Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions
G Roland - Studies in comparative international development, 2004 - Springer
This article proposes a classification of 'slow-moving” and “fast-moving” institutions, and
discusses the potential results of their interaction. A prime example of a slow-moving …
discusses the potential results of their interaction. A prime example of a slow-moving …
Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States
A rich array of institutional diversity makes the United States an excellent place to study the
relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes. This essay has three …
relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes. This essay has three …
The incumbency curse: Weak parties, term limits, and unfulfilled accountability
M Klašnja, R Titiunik - American Political Science Review, 2017 - cambridge.org
We study how representation works in a context where accountability to voters is restricted
because of term limits and accountability to parties is limited because of party weakness …
because of term limits and accountability to parties is limited because of party weakness …