[HTML][HTML] A generalized attack on RSA type cryptosystems
Let N= pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. Some variants of the RSA
cryptosystem, such as LUC, RSA with Gaussian primes and RSA type schemes based on …
cryptosystem, such as LUC, RSA with Gaussian primes and RSA type schemes based on …
A security analysis of two classes of RSA-like cryptosystems
P Cotan, G Teşeleanu - Journal of Mathematical Cryptology, 2024 - degruyter.com
Let N= pq be the product of two balanced prime numbers p and q. In Elkamchouchi et
al.(Extended RSA cryptosystem and digital signature schemes in the domain of Gaussian …
al.(Extended RSA cryptosystem and digital signature schemes in the domain of Gaussian …
Cryptanalysis of RSA variants with primes sharing most significant bits
We consider four variants of the RSA cryptosystem with an RSA modulus N= pq N= pq
where the public exponent e and the private exponent d satisfy an equation of the form ed …
where the public exponent e and the private exponent d satisfy an equation of the form ed …
On the improvement attack upon some variants of RSA cryptosystem via the continued fractions method
Let N= pq be an RSA modulus where p and q are primes not necessarily of the same bit
size. Previous cryptanalysis results on the difficulty of factoring the public modulus N= pq …
size. Previous cryptanalysis results on the difficulty of factoring the public modulus N= pq …
Cryptanalysis of RSA-type cryptosystems based on Lucas sequences, Gaussian integers and elliptic curves
In this paper, we apply the continued fraction method to launch an attack on the three RSA-
type cryptosystems when the private exponent d is sufficiently small. The first cryptosystem …
type cryptosystems when the private exponent d is sufficiently small. The first cryptosystem …
A new attack on some RSA variants
Some variants of the RSA cryptosystem use a modulus of the form N= pq, a public exponent
e, and a private exponent d satisfying a key equation of the form ed− k (p 2− 1)(q 2− 1)= 1. In …
e, and a private exponent d satisfying a key equation of the form ed− k (p 2− 1)(q 2− 1)= 1. In …
A generalized attack on some variants of the RSA cryptosystem
Let N= pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. The RSA cryptosystem can be
attacked by using the key equation ed-k (p-1)(q-1)= 1. Similarly, some variants of RSA, such …
attacked by using the key equation ed-k (p-1)(q-1)= 1. Similarly, some variants of RSA, such …
A Lattice Attack Against a Family of RSA-Like Cryptosystems
G Teşeleanu - International Symposium on Cyber Security, Cryptology …, 2024 - Springer
Let N= pq be the product of two balanced prime numbers p and q. In 2002, Elkamchouchi,
Elshenawy, and Shaban introduced an interesting RSA-like cryptosystem that, unlike the …
Elshenawy, and Shaban introduced an interesting RSA-like cryptosystem that, unlike the …
Cryptanalysis of RSA variants with modified Euler quotient
M Zheng, N Kunihiro, H Hu - … on Cryptology in Africa, Marrakesh, Morocco …, 2018 - Springer
The standard RSA scheme provides the key equation ed ≡ 1 φ (N) ed≡ 1 (mod φ (N)) for
N= pq N= pq, where φ (N)=(p-1)(q-1) φ (N)=(p-1)(q-1) is Euler quotient (or Euler's totient …
N= pq N= pq, where φ (N)=(p-1)(q-1) φ (N)=(p-1)(q-1) is Euler quotient (or Euler's totient …
A generalised bound for the Wiener attack on RSA
Since Wiener pointed out that the RSA can be broken if the private exponent d is relatively
small compared to the modulus N, it has been a general belief that the Wiener attack works …
small compared to the modulus N, it has been a general belief that the Wiener attack works …