Within economics, game theory occupied a rather isolated niche in the 1960s and 1970s. It
was pursued by people who were known specifically as game theorists and who did almost …

This article studies optimal relational contracts when the value of the relationship between
contracting parties is not commonly known. I consider a principal-agent setting where the …

We examine an infinitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority
to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are …

This article describes the emerging game-theoretic framework for modeling long-term
contractual relationships with moral hazard. The framework combines self-enforcement and …

Pricing Algorithms and Tacit Collusion Page 1 Pricing Algorithms and Tacit Collusion Bruno
Salcedo The Pennsylvania State University January 2016 Page 2 Ü/// “The Making of the Fly” …

This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers
choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once …

This paper analyzes a game in which countries repeatedly make emission and technology
investment decisions. We derive the best equilibrium, that is, the Pareto-optimal subgame …

We study relational contracting and renegotiation in environments with external enforcement
of long-term contractual arrangements. A long-term contract governs the stage games that …

A principal can make an investment anticipating a repeated relationship with an agent, but
the agent may appropriate the returns through ex post bargaining. I study how this holdup …

We study infinitely repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and assume that each
period consists of two stages: one in which the players simultaneously choose an action and …