A sender persuades a receiver to accept a project by disclosing information about a payoff‐
relevant quality. The receiver has private information about the quality, referred to as his …

We report results of two laboratory experiments and a representative survey that investigate
how default effects are shaped by information asymmetries and strategic incentives. We …

This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems
when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective …

I study a strategic-communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed
receiver with partially aligned preferences. The receiver is endowed with the ability to …

Cheap-talk lies are at risk of being detected. We investigate the implications of this fact in a
communication game in which players have no common interests and messages are cheap …

This paper considers a model of strategic information transmission with an imperfectly
informed receiver and provides a simple logic by which the receiver's prior knowledge …

The behavioral relevance of non-binding default options is well established. While most
research has focused on decision makers' responses to a given default, we argue that this …

This paper analyzes strategic interactions between cheap talk and lie detection and studies
the optimal equilibrium for costly lie detection and its effectiveness. An informed sender …

This paper shows that operational flexibility interacting with informational uncertainty may
lead to truthful information exchange in equilibrium even when the communication is …

We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the
receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences …