Double-edged incentives: Institutions and policy coordination
T Persson, G Tabellini - Handbook of international economics, 1995 - Elsevier
Publisher Summary This chapter focuses on institutions and policy coordination. A large
portion of international macroeconomics deals with the international transmission of national …
portion of international macroeconomics deals with the international transmission of national …
Strategic delegation: A review, theoretical integration, and research agenda
This article reviews the strategic delegation literature and provides a theoretical framework
that integrates this perspective into management research. The strategic delegation …
that integrates this perspective into management research. The strategic delegation …
Common ownership, competition, and top management incentives
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common
ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership …
ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership …
Comparative politics and public finance
We propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes.
Compared to a parliamentary regime, the institutions of a presidential-congressional regime …
Compared to a parliamentary regime, the institutions of a presidential-congressional regime …
Self-interest through delegation: An additional rationale for the principal-agent relationship
Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from
comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct …
comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct …
[图书][B] Market microstructure: intermediaries and the theory of the firm
DF Spulber - 1999 - books.google.com
This book presents a theory of the firm based on its economic role as an intermediary
between customers and suppliers. Professor Spulber demonstrates how the intermediation …
between customers and suppliers. Professor Spulber demonstrates how the intermediation …
Designing targeting rules for international monetary policy cooperation
This study analyzes a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal
rigidities, monopolistic competition and producer currency pricing. A quadratic …
rigidities, monopolistic competition and producer currency pricing. A quadratic …
[图书][B] The theory of the firm: Microeconomics with endogenous entrepreneurs, firms, markets, and organizations
DF Spulber - 2009 - books.google.com
The Theory of the Firm presents a path-breaking general framework for understanding the
economics of the firm. The book addresses why firms exist, how firms are established, and …
economics of the firm. The book addresses why firms exist, how firms are established, and …
What to maximize if you must
A Heifetz, C Shannon, Y Spiegel - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
The assumption that decision makers choose actions to maximize their preferences is a
central tenet in economics, often justified formally or informally by appealing to evolutionary …
central tenet in economics, often justified formally or informally by appealing to evolutionary …
Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness
E Iossa, D Martimort - International journal of industrial organization, 2016 - Elsevier
We analyze risk allocation and contractual choices when public procurement is plagued with
moral hazard, private information on exogenous shocks, and threat of corruption. Complete …
moral hazard, private information on exogenous shocks, and threat of corruption. Complete …