Double-edged incentives: Institutions and policy coordination

T Persson, G Tabellini - Handbook of international economics, 1995 - Elsevier
Publisher Summary This chapter focuses on institutions and policy coordination. A large
portion of international macroeconomics deals with the international transmission of national …

Strategic delegation: A review, theoretical integration, and research agenda

M Sengul, J Gimeno, J Dial - Journal of Management, 2012 - journals.sagepub.com
This article reviews the strategic delegation literature and provides a theoretical framework
that integrates this perspective into management research. The strategic delegation …

Common ownership, competition, and top management incentives

M Antón, F Ederer, M Giné… - Journal of Political …, 2023 - journals.uchicago.edu
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common
ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership …

Comparative politics and public finance

T Persson, G Roland… - Journal of political …, 2000 - journals.uchicago.edu
We propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes.
Compared to a parliamentary regime, the institutions of a presidential-congressional regime …

Self-interest through delegation: An additional rationale for the principal-agent relationship

JR Hamman, G Loewenstein, RA Weber - American Economic Review, 2010 - aeaweb.org
Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from
comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct …

[图书][B] Market microstructure: intermediaries and the theory of the firm

DF Spulber - 1999 - books.google.com
This book presents a theory of the firm based on its economic role as an intermediary
between customers and suppliers. Professor Spulber demonstrates how the intermediation …

Designing targeting rules for international monetary policy cooperation

G Benigno, P Benigno - Journal of Monetary Economics, 2006 - Elsevier
This study analyzes a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal
rigidities, monopolistic competition and producer currency pricing. A quadratic …

[图书][B] The theory of the firm: Microeconomics with endogenous entrepreneurs, firms, markets, and organizations

DF Spulber - 2009 - books.google.com
The Theory of the Firm presents a path-breaking general framework for understanding the
economics of the firm. The book addresses why firms exist, how firms are established, and …

What to maximize if you must

A Heifetz, C Shannon, Y Spiegel - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
The assumption that decision makers choose actions to maximize their preferences is a
central tenet in economics, often justified formally or informally by appealing to evolutionary …

Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness

E Iossa, D Martimort - International journal of industrial organization, 2016 - Elsevier
We analyze risk allocation and contractual choices when public procurement is plagued with
moral hazard, private information on exogenous shocks, and threat of corruption. Complete …