In a carbon auction, licenses for CO2 emissions are allocated among multiple interested
players. Inspired by this setting, we consider repeated multi-unit auctions with uniform …

We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of
potential buyers, whose values are drawn from known independent and regular (not …

We study the problem of bidding in uniform price auctions widely used in practice. Although
these auctions are non-truthful for bidders with quasilinear utility functions, several empirical …

We consider repeated multi-unit auctions with uniform pricing, which are widely used in
practice for allocating goods such as carbon licenses. In each round, K identical units of a …

We study the performance of the discriminatory price auction under the uniform bidding
interface, which is one of the popular formats for running multi-unit auctions in practice. We …

在商业智能领域, 为求解买卖双方讨价还价博弈的均衡出价策略, 在逆向归纳法的基础上,
开发出两个高效且实用的算法: 基于逆向归纳过程, 设计出迭代算法; 基于逆向归纳结果 …

Consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of
potential buyers, who independently draw their values from regular and publicly known …

The five chapters in this thesis are connected by the following question: How Close Does It
Get? In Chapter 3, we study two pricing problems in networks. We are given a directed …

We initiate the study of the social welfare loss caused by corrupt auctioneers, both in single-
item and multi-unit auctions. In our model, the auctioneer may collude with the winning …

In this thesis we study the existence and (in) efficiency of Nash equilibria in multi-unit
auctions, where an auctioneer is opting to sell several copies of a single indivisible good to …