[图书][B] The self: Naturalism, consciousness, and the first-person stance
J Ganeri - 2012 - books.google.com
What is it to occupy a first-person stance? Is the first-personal idea one has of oneself in
conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be …
conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be …
Sensory binding without sensory individuals
J Quilty-Dunn - Sensory Individuals: Unimodal and Multimodal …, 2023 - books.google.com
One might think of visual processing as operating like an assembly line: subsystems work
out particular subcomponents that are combined to generate a final product, which is then …
out particular subcomponents that are combined to generate a final product, which is then …
Perceptual content and the content of mental imagery
B Nanay - Philosophical Studies, 2015 - Springer
The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and
visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these …
visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these …
[图书][B] Mental imagery: Philosophy, psychology, neuroscience
B Nanay - 2023 - library.oapen.org
This book is about mental imagery and the important work it does in our mental life. It plays a
crucial role in the vast majority of our perceptual episodes. It also helps us understand many …
crucial role in the vast majority of our perceptual episodes. It also helps us understand many …
Objects for multisensory perception
C O'Callaghan - Philosophical Studies, 2016 - Springer
Object perception deploys a suite of perceptual capacities that constrains attention, guides
reidentification, subserves recognition, and anchors demonstrative thought. Objects for …
reidentification, subserves recognition, and anchors demonstrative thought. Objects for …
What do we see in pictures? The sensory individuals of picture perception
B Nanay - Philosophical Studies, 2022 - Springer
When I am looking at an apple, I perceptually attribute certain properties to certain entities.
Two questions arise: what are these entities (what is it that I perceptually represent as …
Two questions arise: what are these entities (what is it that I perceptually represent as …
[图书][B] Apoha: Buddhist nominalism and human cognition
M Siderits, TJF Tillemans, A Chakrabarti - 2011 - books.google.com
When we understand that something is a pot, is it because of one property that all pots
share? This seems unlikely, but without this common essence, it is difficult to see how we …
share? This seems unlikely, but without this common essence, it is difficult to see how we …
Audio-visual objects
In this paper we offer a theory of cross-modal objects. To begin, we discuss two kinds of
linkages between vision and audition. The first is a duality. The the visual system detects …
linkages between vision and audition. The first is a duality. The the visual system detects …
Dual structure of touch: The body vs. peripersonal space
M Matthen - 2020 - philpapers.org
The sense of touch provides us knowledge of two kinds of events. Tactile sensation (T)
makes us aware of events on or just below the skin; haptic perception (H) gives us …
makes us aware of events on or just below the skin; haptic perception (H) gives us …
Objects, places, and perception
J Cohen - Philosophical Psychology, 2004 - Taylor & Francis
In Clark (2000), Austen Clark argues convincingly that a widespread view of perception as a
complicated kind of feature-extraction is incomplete. He argues that perception has another …
complicated kind of feature-extraction is incomplete. He argues that perception has another …